PRIME EXECUTIVE PLAN FOR IRAQ


Revised 12/31/2003





~ Outline ~


1. FORWARD
2. INTRODUCTION
3. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
4. POWER OF REPRESENTATION
5. PRIME EXECUTIVE
6. PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE
7. NO CONFIDENCE VOTES
8. REMOVAL OF A PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE
9. MAIN EVENTS FOR NO CONFIDENCE & REMOVAL
10. IMPEACHMENT
11. SUCCESSION FOR A PROVINCIAL TO PRIME EXECUTIVE
12. SECESSION OF PROVINCES
13. CAVEATS
14. REVISIONS
15. ADVANTAGES OF IMPLEMENTING PRIME EXECUTIVE PLAN








Forward


Subject: Prime Executive Plan For Iraq

The following is a proposed outline for the new government structure of Iraq. I am sending it for consideration to help in determining the permanent government of the country after the interim government establishes proper order. I submit this proposal in the hopes of helping provide some solution.

Appreciably Yours,

Mark Andrew Smith




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Introduction


~~~Prime Executive Plan for Iraq~~~

{This is a revised edition which includes more information regarding the selelction of the Prime Executive -- July 2003}

Herein lies a proposal for the new government structure of Iraq. This plan counts on Iraq being an eventual constitutional republic with direct or indirect representative-based government at all the government levels. There should be a bill of rights. The national and state/provincial governments should all consist of three branches: executive, legislative and judicial. All branches would implement a series of checks and balances upon each other. The legislative branches will have bicameral houses with one house based on proportional populations and the other consisting only of appointed officials picked by the provincial or county governments that represent those political subdivisions on equal terms.

Because of the political, ethnic and religious rivalries that may exist amongst provinces, the national government of Iraq must be reflexive enough to keep one province or group of provinces or even factions from taking too much hold on the national direction of the country. However, the national government must also be flexible enough to accomodate the sovereignty of the provinces and their interests. The national government must also be strong enough to ensure a republique, constitutional form of government throughout the provinces and balanced enough to allow all factions to have some say in national direction.

Considering all these factors in war-torn Iraq, a special way to structure and determine national leadership for the Iraqi Union is here presented. Since the judicial and legislative branches would be mostly similar in function to their counterparts in other free republics around the world, the focus of description here will be on the executive branch for Iraq. The national executive branch for Iraq would be a proposed hybrid of prime minister systems in parliamentary governments like Canada, England, Israel, India, Turkey and previously Pakistan and the presidencies like those of the U.S., Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia and the Russian Federation.



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EXECUTIVE BRANCH:



Executive Council


The executive branch for Iraq would consist of a body of provincial executives. This body will be a collection of executives equal in number to the provinces of Iraq. Each province chooses their one executive to hold a seat on behalf of their province in this body officially called the Executive Council of Iraq. The executive from each province will be chosen by any one of the following methods: a direct popular vote by the people in the province, a vote by a body of electors who are chosen in a manner determined by the provincial legislature or the executive is appointed by the provincial government in a manner it specifies by law. A province that utilizes a vote by the people may use the instant run-off method or the Condorcet method.



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Power Of Representation


Each provincial executive's relative power of representation will be based in part on the proportional population held by the province they represent. The apportionment of this power of representation is described below and used in any votes pertaining to choosing a Prime Executive or in collectively vetoing an executive action or order.

A number of total voting points will be determined for the body of provincial executives and that total must be sufficient enough in order to be apportioned in an adequate manner reflecting the population of each province via the following scheme:

That total number of determined voting points will be divided in half. The first half will be equally distributed amongst the provincial executives . The second half will be distributed amongst the provincial executives proportionately according to the populations of their respective provinces. The number of voting points thus given to each provincial executive will determine the relative power of representation of each provincial executive when it comes to vetos of executive issues or choosing a new prime executive. Any voting method used will be tailored to reflect this power of representation on those issues. Votes of no confidence will not use this power scheme.



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Prime Executive


When all the provinces have chosen their provincial executives, the provincial executives shall meet in the Iraqi capital and after some amount of time to evaluate one another they shall vote one amongst themselves as the Prime Executive of Iraq. They shall do so by a ballot using instant-runoff method or the Condorcet method which reflects their powers of representation. There will be the restriction that no provincial executive will be allowed to vote for themself as the Prime Executive. Each can only cast votes for their peers. A voting mechanism that guarantees all of the above will have been devised and tested beforehand. If the winner of the vote declines to be Prime Executive, then the next highest winner of votes will become Prime Executive. If they decline, then the third highest -- and so on.

A provincial executive may abstain from voting for the Prime Executive. If there is still an adequate majority of voting points amongst the participating provincial executives then whoever wins election will run against the abstaining provincial executive(s) for the office of Prime Executive. The winner of such a race will be determined by vote of both houses of the Iraqi Congress. Otherwise, when there is not an adequate majority of voting points amongst the particpating provincial executives, then a case exists where the Executive Council is unable to clearly determine a winner.

When the Executive Council is unable to clearly determine a winner, there is a tie or it is unwilling to decide upon the Prime Executive for various reasons then either the Iraqi Senate or the Iraqi House of Representatives will decide upon which provincial executive will be Prime Executive by a vote (utilizing Condorcet or instant run-off methods). When this is the case, if half or more of the provincial executives*** in the council acquired their offfice (directly or indirectly) by vote of the people within their provinces then the Iraqi Senate shall choose the Prime Executive. Otherwise, the Iraqi House of Representatives shall choose the Prime Executive. If however the Iraqi House or Senate are unable to determine or unwilling to choose the Prime Executive, then the Prime Executive will be chosen by lot from amongst the Executive Council. When the Iraqi Senate or House must determine a winner solely because of a tie between candidates, then their votes will be cast only for the tying candidates in question. If a sufficient majority of voting points were cast amongst participating provincial executives and there was a tie concurrent with abstentions, then the tying candidates and the abstainees will be voted on for Prime Executive by the proper house of the Iraqi Congress.

*** (Actually, it is more appropriate to measure whether or not half or more of the apportioned voting points have been assigned to provincial executives who were voted in by the people of their respective provinces.)

Once the Prime Executive is chosen, he may appoint his replacement (who perhaps was declared during the provincial campaign) as the administrative provincial executive for his own province. The administrative must be from the same province. The administrative may act on behalf of the orginally chosen provincial executive and may report to and yield action to the originally chosen provincial executive when requested. When provincial elections or appointments for provincial executives return, the Prime Executive's province will treat the administrative appointee as their incumbent provincial executive and he will surrender office if defeated in the election or he will be dismissed by the provincial government if the province decides to appoint a new provincial executive.

The determination of a second term for an incumbant Prime Executive would be decided by an electoral college determined at the next elections cycle. The college votes simply whether or not the sitting Prime Executive will remain for another term. If a second term is granted, the Prime Executive remains in office and functions with the new Executive Council that was determined during the same interim election. If the second term is denied, then the new Executive Council chooses a new Prime Executive who in turn fills in his original provincial executive position with his named replacement unless his province appoints its provincial executives. In that case, the provincial government appoints a successor.

The Prime Executive will be the executive head of state and head of government for the Iraqi nation. The Prime Executive may have similar powers and function within like parmameters of a president. However, for some limited issues more relating to the sole concerns and functions within the executive branch; seperate from the process transacting between the legislative branch and the Prime Executive concerning the passage of laws, the power of veto shall be granted to the Executive Council.

As well, the Prime Executive will have the power to call on the armed forces to quell domestic insurrections and rebellions and to re-enforce laws of the Iraqi Union but the ability to declare a state of official sustained civil war will be granted to the Supreme Court of Iraq. Likewise, the Prime Executive will have the power to call on the armed forces to repel invasions and to attack foreign lands but the power to declare a state of official sustained war will be granted to the Iraqi Congress.



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Provincial Executive


Each provincial executive will act as a liason between their provincial government and the national government of Iraq. A provincial executive will be the administrative head and manager of the federal directives and federal operations within and concerning the respective province from which that provincial executive was elected/appointed. A provincial executive will have the authority to implement federal directives from either the congress or the Prime Executive in a manner that fulfills the Iraqi Constitution and obeys either the Prime Executive's or the congress' due authority. This is to say that a Provincial Executive can oversee and direct federal operations and orders within and concerning their province utilizing a style, approach or method that lies within the given parameters of the orders of the congress or the Prime Executive and does not violate the Iraqi Constitution. Any style, approach or method can also be utilized to implement federal operations and orders in such a manner that improvises upon any sufficiently vague or non-descript aspect of those given orders and violates no federal or applicable provincial regulations. Freedom to improvise upon any sufficient vagueness of such orders may be carried out until legally halted by a sufficient federal/provincial authority upon a court ruling that there is just cause of the method being illegal or unconstitutional or unauthoritive. Such haltings may be challenged in court by the provincial executive or on his behalf.

If a provincial executive feels that an order is not constitutional or is beyond the right of the congress or the Prime Executive to direct, then the Provincial Executive may suspend implementation of said orders (in part or in whole) upon challenging of such orders in the courts at some appropriate level. If a challenge is found to be valid and sustained, then the Provincial Executive can subsequently deny such orders or opt to fulfill such orders in a valid manner. If such a challenge is not sustained, or outright rejected then the Provincial Executive will yield and invoke such orders in a proper manner.

If a Provincial Executive refuses orders on some principle and makes no challenge in the courts then it is up to the Prime Executive or congress to make a court challenge. If no challenge is issued by the Prime Executive or the congress then the conflict can be considered 'resolved' until challenges in court are taken.

A procedure or formality to allege through simple refusal that orders are un-constitutional or beyond congressional or Prime Executive authority (or even just inappropriate) by a Provincial Executive may be formalized by the Iraqi congress.

There will be some reserved domain issues where the Provincial Executives will have sole authority as to how their respective province will fulfill or function in the federal union, asserting the sovereignty of the respective province.



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No Confidence Votes


Votes of no confidence can be lodged against the sitting Prime Executive by the Executive Council. Votes of no confidence will be proposed when some on the council feel the Prime Executive has practiced poor policy, failed technically in handling more momentous issue(s) or carried out the duties of Prime Executive in a substantially substandard manner. No confidence votes by the council should not be carried out simply because there is disagreement on issues even when the Prime Executive is in the minority. There will always be differences of opinion between the Prime Executive and the council on various issues throughout the term(s) of the Prime Executive, perhaps especially for some council members who voted for someone else as Prime Executive. However, a no confidence vote can be issued short of a political catastrophe. For example, if a Prime Executive makes major changes to any promised approach to governing without much justifiable cause after he gains office and the council feels there is a case of mis-representation on behalf of the Prime Executive, then a no confidece vote may be appropriate. Yet, if a Prime Executive merely makes some honest changes to his approach on some issues, even some major ones due to unforeseen circumstances or upon new information acquired after gaining office, then a vote of no confidence would not be appropriate.

When a no confidence vote is proposed, the specific reason for the vote will be logged and the Supreme Court of Iraq will review the reason to see if it is founded and within constitutional tolerance and not frivolous, petty, vague or untruthful. The specific reason to instigate and the historical reasons to give weight to the measure will be logged under the categories of: detrimental policy, technical mishandling, general substandard performance and another special category will list the occurences of any frivolous or unconstitutional petitions for removal of provincial executives.

If a proposal for a no confidence vote is approved by the Supreme Court then 80% or greater of the council members must pass it to allow new election for a new Prime Executive. Else, the no confidence vote is merely symbolic. Before the vote for a new Prime Executive due to no confidence, the current Prime Executive's provincial government may opt to declare a new provincial executive to represent them in the council.



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Removal Of A Provincial Executive


The power to remove a provincial executive is granted to the Prime Executive but happens only if approved by majority of the Iraqi Supreme Court for each case. The Supreme Court will review the request for removal to determine whether it is founded in a similar manner that no confidence votes upon the Prime Executive are. Some of the reasons for petition to remove a sitting provincial executive are: multiple filings of court challenges to federal orders without due cause (frivolous filings), filing multiple court challenges that are un-constitutional, refusal to implement federal orders that have been upheld within the courts, faulted for failing to implement federal orders without challenging them through proper procedures, multiple frivolous and/or unconstitutional filings of no confidence votes.

Before any no confidence vote can be approved by the Supreme Court, all previous petitions for removal of provincial executives must be reviewed by the court.

After a petition to remove is approved, a new provincial executive will be appointed by the provincial government and approved by the Prime Executive. If this newly appointed provincial executive commits two or more instances of the above listed reasons for petition of removal and those instances are verifed by the Supreme Court record, the Prime Executive may appoint a new provincial executive of his own choosing for that province as long as the appointee is from the province in question.



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Main Events For No Confidence Votes And Petitions For Removal


There must be a current & enacted main complaint, issue or event that is the basis for the filing of any no confidence vote or a petition to remove a provincial executive. The main issue must be specifically named in the submittal. Such filings should happen within a certain time period of the latest, main event -- a statute of limitation for the main complaint should be imposed. Otherwise, the filed action will not even be considered by the Supreme Court. In totality, the main action may be viewed as the latest occurence that breaks the 'camel's back' if there is a patterned history of the official to be removed. Any other reasons listed would serve to provide a weighted pattern, history and background as to why the current office holder should go. Such history may even be reasons for prior submitted filings.

Having a specific main event as mandatory for such actions to even be considered will help preserve better stability of the government, lower case loads on the Supreme Court, reduce purely revenge filings by any opposing executive(s), encourage a more immediate elimination of the more faulty executives, install an obstacle to political blackmail and lessen the vulnerability of executives to submit proper court filings.



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Impeachment


No confidence votes and petitions for removal are not to be used in place of the procedures for impeachment. Impeachment will deal solely with high crimes and sufficient misdemeanors.



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Succession For a Provincial To Prime Executive


Wherever a provincial executive is elected by the home province, it may be best if the replacement is named in the campaign beforehand in case the main candidate becomes Prime Executive after getting on the Executive Council.



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Secession Of Provinces


In the end, it is wise to allow provinces the option to secede from the Iraqi Union if they wish in an orderly and peaceful manner. This is for if nothing else, a release valve in times of great tension. There should be, however, the stipulation that certain federal property and equipment must be turned over to the Iraqi Union and military personnel & federal workers not citizens of the province in question allowed exodus. If the province decides later to reinstate into the union, it will then have to pay a prize or duty to do so.



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Caveats


Until a proper census can be taken, an assessment of the population and thus relative representation of the provinces can be made by quantitating agricultural or economic activity or observing the effect of populations on the environment by satellite imagery and the like.

Until widespread elections are feasible and able to be implemented in a safe and accurate air to a sophisticated enough populace, concentrated elections may be held only in the larger cities, towns and settlements to determine leadership at various regional levels. There may be a higher reliance on appointment of officials until fuller implementation.



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Revisions


There may be need to revise or to further specify some of the structure in this plan for Iraq's new government. It also may be sometime before the infrastucture of the country and the sophistication of the populace is sufficient to reach the ideal implementation. However, this proposal should give a good idea for much of the structure for the new Iraqi Union that will hopefully provide a flexible and strong cohesion for the country.



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Advantages Of Implementing Prime Executive Plan


Here is a list of some of the advantages of the Prime Executive Plan:

1. The strain on the country of differing ethnic, religious and political rivalries will make it difficult for a candidate for national leader to campaign across all of the country and appeal to varying groups. Allowing the Executive Council to choose a national leader from amongst themselves each of whom represent their province's desired leadership and management style may keep any potential conflicts amongst the masses contained within provinces or possibly prevent them altogether.

2. Any fear of a national leader attaining total executive authority is quelled by having an Executive Council who will have some veto power on certain matters and can keep check on the Prime Executive with no confidence votes. Also, the provinces will retain some sovereignty on executive issues by their Provincial Executives being delegated to manage and implement the Prime Executive's or Executive Council's rulings within parameters of reason. If done properly, this can take the heat off of the executive branch in dealings on federal matters within the provinces.

3. The Senate members will be appointed by the provincial governments to maintain a voice for provincial government interests in the federal level. This also brings consistency since how the people are governed by their provincial interests will also be voiced at the federal level. This will help limit federal power from becoming too overbearing. This is how the Senate originally functioned in the U.S. and in other current and historical republics.

4. The appointment of senators, the possible appointment of Provincial Executives/Executive Council members will make the overall new government more pallatable to more traditional forces. But remember, this will also function as a check on the people who may fall prey to strong populist forces that could swell from the grassroots.

5. The second or successive terms of the Prime Executive are determined by an electoral college ideally reflecting the popular vote of the people during times of stability and peace. The people will simply vote yay or nay on whether or not the Prime Executive gets another term. This will allow the people as one nation to voice their satisfaction with the national leader. If voted out, the newly elected Executive Council will again choose one amongst themselves to attain the Prime Executive position. This process will provide the incentive for a national leader to adequately appeal to the peoples' national interests without a destabilizing, cumbersome or overly populist national campaign .

6. The popular votes for leaders are focused in the representative houses of the legislative branches (provincial & federal). Popular votes for governors of the provinces and provincial executives depend on whether the province allows popular elections for those offices. At the very least, the popular election of representative legislators in the apportioned houses is guaranteed, which may be best to keep the logistics of elections accurate and safe and protect the electorate from the overwhelming distraction of populist political ploys throughout the rest of the government.

7. The national legislative branch will decide whether to declare a full scale war on any foreign force or nation where appropriate. However, when it comes to an internal civil conflict, the Supreme Court will decide whether or not a war is warranted against the faction in question. The decision will be based on whether the faction is in fact violating the law or Constitution of the country, otherwise it may be the government itself who is in violation of the law. The validity of an inner conflict is better determined by law whereas a foreign conflict is more determined by measuring threat, politics and national interests. Also, the regional allegiances of the legislative body make it more biased on internal conflicts whereas the Court is more ideally only allegiant to the law.



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Thank-you for your time.


Prime Executive Plan For Iraq
last revised December 2003
Web Page Constructed By: United Web Pages



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